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The transformation of solidarity in times 
of austerity: The case of Greece
Andreas Feronas, University of the Peloponnese
Ο µετασχηµατισµός της κοινωνικής αλληλεγγύης 
στην εποχή της λιτότητας: Η ελληνική περίπτωση
Ανδρέας Φερώνας, Πανεπιστήµιο Πελοποννήσου
ΠΕΡIΛΗΨΗ 
Η εµµένουσα σοβαρή οικονοµική κρίση που βι-
ώνει η Ελλάδα τα τελευταία οκτώ χρόνια, δεν έχει 
µόνο οδηγήσει σε µια πρωτοφανή κοινωνική κρί-
ση, αλλά έχει επίσης θέσει σε αµφισβήτηση τα 
παραδοσιακά εδραιωµένα πρότυπα κοινωνικής 
αλληλεγγύης. Υιοθετώντας έναν ευρύ ορισµό της 
κοινωνικής αλληλεγγύης, ως «της προθυµίας για 
διαµοιρασµό των κοινωνικών κινδύνων», το πα-
ρόν άρθρο στοχεύει στην ανάδειξη δύο παράλλη-
λων διαδικασιών µετασχηµατισµού της κοινωνικής 
αλληλεγγύης στην Ελλάδα στο πλαίσιο της τρέχου-
σας κρίσης. Πρώτον, τη σηµαντική περιστολή µιας 
ήδη προβληµατικής (πριν από την κρίση) θεσµο-
ποιηµένης αλληλεγγύης του κράτους πρόνοιας, 
που επιβλήθηκε σε µεγάλο βαθµό από τις διαδο-
χικές συµφωνίες διάσωσης µε την Τρόικα. ∆εύτε-
ρον, την ανάδυση µιας πληθώρας µορφών άτυπης 
κοινωνικής αλληλεγγύης, µε σκοπό τη στήριξη των 
κοινωνικών οµάδων που επλήγησαν περισσότερο 
από την κρίση. Το άρθρο καταλήγει στο συµπέρα-
σµα ότι αν και η τελευταία έχει διαδραµατίσει ένα 
σηµαντικό ρόλο στην παροχή άµεσης ανακούφι-
σης στις πιο ευάλωτες κοινωνικές οµάδες, δεν πρέ-
πει να θεωρείται ούτε πανάκεια για την επίλυση 
κοινωνικών προβληµάτων ούτε ως υποκατάστατο 
της θεσµοποιηµένης αλληλεγγύης του κράτους 
πρόνοιας, σε µια εποχή που η ζήτηση για την κοι-
νωνική προστασία έχει αυξηθεί δραµατικά.
ΛΕΞΕΙΣ-ΚΛΕΙ∆ΙΑ: Κοινωνική αλληλεγγύη, λιτότη-
τα, κράτος πρόνοιας, κοινωνία πολιτών, Ελλάδα.
ABSTRACT
The severe economic crisis that has surfaced 
in Greece over the last eight years, not only 
has resulted to an unprecedented social cri-
sis but has also challenged long established 
domestic patterns of solidarity. By defining 
social solidarity very generally as “the willing-
ness to share social risks” this paper aims at 
highlighting two parallel processes of trans-
formation of solidarity in Greece in the con-
text of the ongoing crisis. First, a process of 
retrenchment of an already problematic for-
mal welfare state solidarity, largely imposed 
by the successive bail out agreements with 
the Troika. Secondly, the emergence of vari-
ous forms of informal solidarity, aimed at sup-
porting the social groups most affected by the 
crisis. The paper concludes that although the 
latter has played an important role in offer-
ing immediate relief to those “in need”, is far 
from being considered, neither as a panacea 
for solving social problems nor as a substitute 
to welfare state solidarity, at a time when the 
demand for social protection has increased 
dramatically.  
KEY WORDS: Social solidarity, austerity, 
welfare state, civil society, Greece.
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1. Introduction
T he aim of this paper is to highlight some key aspects of transformation of social solidarity in Greece after the crisis. More specifically, it focuses on the changing balance between 
formal and informal solidarity taking place in the country, as a result of the ongoing economic 
crisis that has had obvious painful consequences for the social well-being of large sections of 
the population.
«Social solidarity» is, over time, one of the core but also most complex and controversial 
concepts in social science. It is approached in different ways by different sociological schools and 
theoretical traditions, but it is also constantly transforming, reflecting the rapid economic, social 
and cultural changes in society (Oosterlynck and van Bouchaute 2013). Etymologically it draws 
its origin from the legal concept of Roman law «in solidum», referring to the joint responsibil-
ity of a group for the debts of one of the group members (Bayertz 1999). With this meaning it 
was adopted by French lawyers in the 16th century and subsequently included in the Napoleonic 
Code in 1804 (Stjerno 2004: 27). In the context of Christian ethics, and in particular in Catholic 
teaching, it was identified with the concept of «brotherhood» which was expressed in the acts 
of love and charity towards the fellow man (Stjerno 2004). During the French Revolution, the 
concept of «brotherhood» gradually acquired political content in order to declare a sense of 
political community, while the phrase «equality, freedom, brotherhood» constituted one of the 
fundamental values  of Western modernity. In the 19th century, religious interpretations of the 
organization and functioning of society are gradually receding and the concept of «brotherhood» 
is replaced by the concept of «solidarity». At that time, French utopians and social philosophers, 
such as Fourier and Leroux, began to use «solidarity» as a concept that states the attitude and 
relationships that are characterized by mutual sympathy among individuals who are united in a 
community. Fourier was the first to link solidarity with social policy, arguing that it should include 
the allocation of resources to people in need, a minimum guaranteed income and public support 
for families. Then, the classical sociologists (Comte, Durkheim, Simmel, Weber, etc.) began to 
systematically elaborate on the concept of «solidarity», trying to identify the sources of social 
cohesion in the transition from traditional to modern industrial society (Stjerno 2004).
Despite the fact that the sociological interest in social solidarity was fallen during most of the 
20th century (Crow 2002; Wilde 2007), it has been rejuvenated, during the last decades, through 
the works of prominent contemporary sociologists (Beck 1997; Giddens 1994; Habermas 1995). 
Obviously, the classic question raised by Durkheim ([1893], 1984), namely «what are the bonds 
which unite men one with another and to society?» is set today on different terms, reflecting the 
rapid structural changes that marked the transition to modern post-industrial societies. These 
changes have posed significant challenges on how social solidarity is conceptually constituted, 
collectively organized and institutionally expressed through the welfare state, and also have con-
tributed to the development of new forms of social solidarity (Wilde 2007; Feronas 2015).
For the purposes of this paper we define social solidarity very broadly as “the willingness to 
share social risks”. We consider this definition very useful for two reasons. First, with its empha-
sis on “willingness to share”, it reminds us that ‘positive’ feelings and attitudes must be acted 
on if the idea of solidarity is to have any substance (Wilde 2007:172). As Stjerno (2004:3) has 
pointed out solidarity is not morally good per se and the adjective “positive” is meant to distin-
guish solidarity, either from the negative relation between people or groups who are fighting or 
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are competitive to each other (de Beer and Koster 2009:15) or from illegal group practices (eg. 
criminal organizations) (Kantzara 2014:266). In this paper, solidarity has an inclusive rather than 
an exclusive character, meaning that the well-being of one person or of one group is positively 
related to the well-being of another person or group in society (Van Oorschot 1991, as cited in 
De Beer and Koster 2009:15). 
Second, this definition allows for different forms of the “delivery” of solidarity to be consid-
ered. An important distinction here is between formal and informal solidarity. Formal solidarity 
implies ‘the preparedness to share resources with others by personal contribution to those in 
struggle or in need through taxation and redistribution organised by the state’ (Stjerno 2004:2). 
In this regard the welfare state embodies most of the formal compulsory solidarity (De Beer and 
Koster 2009: 41), since it’s gradual development from the late 19th century could be approached 
as the result of three parallel processes. Firstly, an awareness of the social nature of social risks (eg 
poverty, illness, disability, old age, etc.), that is the assumption that the latter do not arise from 
an individual choice but are products of the social system. Second, the willingness to collectively 
cover social risks and third, the gradual development of a series of social institutions designed to 
manage social risks, such as social security, health care, labor market regulation, social assistance, 
etc. (Van de Veer, et al. 2012). Comparative research in the field of social policy (eg. G. Esping 
Andersen 1990) has shown that the traditional welfare state in Europe has not developed in a 
uniform way, reflecting the diversity of the philosophical and theoretical traditions of social soli-
darity (liberal, conservative corporatist, social democratic, etc.). The relationship between social 
solidarity and the development of a welfare state is two-way and complex. The strong support 
of individuals for state redistribution and service provision can be a prerequisite for the develop-
ment and maintenance of a strong welfare state, but the opposite is also true. The existence of 
a generous welfare state is a powerful lever to maintain and strengthen social solidarity among 
individuals (de Beer and Kostner 2009: 51).
On the other hand, informal solidarity concerns mostly voluntary solidarity (either organized 
or not) and springs from a direct involvement and sympathy with fellow human beings. The most 
intense forms of informal solidarity are usually found within the family, while less intense forms 
concern help and support between friends, neighbors, colleagues, within civil society organiza-
tions and social networks or even towards strangers on the street (de Beer and Koster 2009:20-21).
The argument put forward in this paper is that the ongoing economic crisis in Greece has 
challenged long established domestic patterns of solidarity. In particular, it has marked a double 
transformation in the way solidarity is organized and delivered. One the one hand, a substantial 
decline in compulsory formal welfare state solidarity, largely imposed by the successive bail out 
agreements with the Troika. On the other hand, the emergence of informal solidarity, through 
an extensive civil society mobilization in setting up various groups and organizations in order to 
help those “vulnerable groups” most affected by the crisis. The paper concludes that although 
the latter has played an important role in offering immediate relief to those “in need”, is far from 
being considered neither as a panacea for solving social problems nor as a substitute to welfare 
state solidarity at a time when the demand for social protection has increased dramatically.
The paper is structured as follows. Section two provides a brief account of the traditional 
patterns of solidarity in Greece before the crisis that were strongly embedded in the southern 
model of welfare. Section three critically discusses recent changes in the way social solidarity is 
organized and expressed in the context of the ongoing economic crisis. Finally, section four sum-
marizes the main conclusions drawn from the foregoing analysis.
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2. Traditional Patterns of Solidarity in pre-crisis Greece
F ormal solidarity in Greece before the economic crisis was manifested in the context of a wel-fare state that has been classified as belonging to a distinct ‘Southern welfare regime’, being 
characterized by underdeveloped state provision; extreme fragmentation of the social security 
system; large gaps in social protection, the selective distribution of benefits through clientelism 
and strong familialism in social protection and service provision; (Leibfried 1992; Ferrera 1996). 
Indeed, the Greek welfare state before the crisis exhibited practically all characteristics associated 
with the aforementioned welfare model. A segmented labour market, where those regularly em-
ployed, the so called insiders (e.g. civil servants, employees of state-owned enterprises, the liberal 
professions) were often over-protected and enjoyed generous benefits while those without regu-
lar employment and the unemployed (outsiders) were left with no protection and scant social 
benefits. A public, first pillar, earnings related and highly fragmented and particularistic social 
insurance system, which reinforced the above mentioned divide between insiders and outsiders 
in the labour market. A National Health System (NHS), which introduced in 1983, combined with 
a large number of occupational-based health insurance funds which provided unequal access to 
health services. And, finally, a social assistance system which was characterized by considerable 
gaps in the social safety net, the selective distribution of benefits through clientelism and the ab-
sence of a minimum guaranteed income scheme, which would provide for the social protection 
of all the population in case of need (Sakellaropoulos and Economou 2006; Matsaganis 2013). 
As for informal solidarity, the Greek family has traditionally played a central role in protect-
ing its members from the exposure to social risks (Zambarloukou 2015), partly compensating for 
the failures of the formal sector. It is indicative that for some scholars Greece, as well as the rest 
of the southern European countries, are part of a particular type of welfare model - which they 
identify as ‘familistic welfare model’ - where family plays a key role as an institution that provides 
‘decommodification’ when its members are out of the labour market or lack the necessary re-
sources to maintain their living standard (Papadopoulos and Roumbakis 2009:5). That role of the 
family is not only confined to household members but refers to an extensive network of kin that 
‘provides a mechanism for aggregating and redistributing resources among its members’ (Allen 
and Scruggs 2004: 116). 
Apart from the key role of the family and compared to other Western European countries, 
Greece had a weak civil society both in terms of its quantitative dimension and it’s formal/insti-
tutional composition (Afouxenidis 2004). Moreover, it was characterized by a widespread apathy 
towards voluntarism, a lack of civic engagement among citizens and a low stock of social capital 
and confidence (Afouxenidis 2004, 2006; Sotiropoulos and Karmagioli 2006). The underdevelop-
ment of civil society in Greece has been attributed to a number of reasons, such as its depend-
ence on an inflated state (Tsoukalas 1986), the prevalence of clientelistic relations (Sotiropoulos 
2001), the existence of powerful political parties (Voulgaris 2001) and the dependence of certain 
unions on the state (Mavrogrodatos 1988). 
In brief, social solidarity in Greece before the crisis was fragmented, inequitable, politically 
and socially biased and ineffective, with the family playing a key role in covering the gaps of the 
formal welfare state sector. 
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3. The changing patterns of solidarity in Greece after the crisis
3.1. The social consequences of the crisis
T he persistent economic and social crisis experienced by Greece has obvious painful conse-quences for the social well-being of citizens. Between 2010 and 2016 GDP had shrunk by 
24.4 %. In 2013, unemployment reached its highest levels at 27.5 % and still remains the high-
est in the EU (23.5% in January 2017), while youth unemployment stood at 61% (48 % in early 
2017). Moreover, in 2016 the poverty risk estimated at the 2008 poverty line, more than doubled 
(from 20% to 48%), showing the highest increase among EU Member States over the same pe-
riod, while 35.7% of the country’s population ran the risk of poverty or social exclusion. In the 
same year, the share of those who were severely materially deprived was 22.2%, while the people 
aged 0-59 living in jobless households was 16.8%. Finally, a significant increase in the risk of child 
poverty is particularly worrying (Table 1).
Table 1: The Social Consequences of the Crisis
Selected social indicators 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
ΑΕΠ -4,3 -5,5 -9,1 -7,3 -3,2 0,4 -0,2 0,0
Unemployment rate 9,6 12,7 17,9 24,5 27,5 26,5 24,9 23,6
Youth unemployment rate 25,7 33 44,7 55,3 58,3 52,4 49,8 47,3
Percentage of the population 
aged 0-59 living in households 
with very low work intensity 
6,6 7,6 12 14,2 18,2 17,2 16,8 17,2
At risk of poverty rate 19,1 19,3 20,9 22,5 22,4 22,2 21,5 21,2
At risk of poverty rate 
anchored at a fixed moment 
in time (2008)
18,9 18 24,9 35,8 44,3 48 48 48,9
Severe material deprivation 11 11,6 15,2 19,5 20,3 21,5 22,2 22,4
At risk of poverty and/or social 
exclusion
27,6 27,7 31 34,6 35,7 36 35,7 35,6
Child poverty rate 23,4 22,3 23,3 26,5 28,7 25,3 26,1 25,6
Πηγή: Eurostat
As will be shown in the next sections, the humanitarian crisis caused by the economic crisis 
has influenced a transformation in the way social solidarity is organized and delivered, namely a 
further retrenchment of an already problematic formal welfare state solidarity and an emergence 
of new forms of voluntary informal solidarity. 
3.2. The “external” imposition of a decline of formal welfare 
state solidarity 
The crisis has highlighted the inefficiency of the formal welfare state solidarity. And despite the 
fact that the extreme social conditions that have been created have made it imperative to under-
take public policy initiatives on “cushioning” the social consequences of the crisis, this has not 
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happened. Neoliberal “austerity”, which already had emerged since the mid-2000s in the context 
of international organizations (Sakellaropoulos, 2011:54), became the dominant policy response 
to deal with the EMU crisis and the sovereign debt crisis of the most troubled countries in the 
European periphery (Schmidt and Thatcher, 2013). The reforms launched under the country’s 
successive Memorandum of Understandings (MoUs), from 2010 onwards, have led to the further 
degradation of an already perforated social safety net. While social spending cuts were universal 
(health, social security, social welfare, etc.), the measures to support the most vulnerable social 
groups were sporadic and fragmentary, unable to compensate for the huge losses caused by the 
great waves of austerity (Sotiropoulos 2014b). The overall result of the reforms in major social 
policy fields reveals a process of retrenchment of formal welfare state solidarity. Pensions and 
labour market policies were the two traditional pillars of the Greek welfare state which experi-
enced radical institutional changes, while severe cuts were imposed in other social policy fields 
(health care, social assistance, etc.) (Guillen and Pavolini 2015). In what follows we briefly review 
recent major welfare state reforms1.
In the area of pensions, a comprehensive reform, that changed central characteristics of the 
system, was required already by the first MoU (2010) with the aim of controlling the increase in 
pension spending (Theodoropoulou 2014). The resultant path-breaking reform (L.3864/2010) re-
placed the Bismarkian social insurance system with a unified, multi-tier system that distinguishes 
between a basic (quasi-universal2) non-contributory pension funded from the central budget 
which, based on 2016 prices, will amount to 384 euros, and a contributory pension which will 
be calculated taking into account the entire working life of the individual and years in employ-
ment. This structural change was accompanied by parametric changes, such as the rise of retire-
ment age from 65 to 67, the elimination of early retirement and the lowering of replacement 
rates (Feronas 2013; Zambarloukou 2015). Current retirees also saw their pensions to be reduced 
dramatically through successive rounds of cuts in primary and auxiliary pensions and the gradual 
reduction of EKAS, a supplementary benefit for low income pensioners3. Some of the changes 
stipulated did indeed served to introduce some long overdue elements of modernization into the 
Greek system (eg. the integration of pension funds into three major funds: the salary employees, 
the self-employed and the farmers; the streamlining of benefits; the implementation of similar 
criteria to all occupational groups, etc.), but they still have remained incomplete. Some scholars 
have argued that the structure of the new system could almost be described as Scandinavian 
(Matsaganis 2012:11). However, the basic pension provided by the new system is very low and 
the combination of shrinking pensionable income and lower replacement rates will significantly 
reduce pensions of future retirees (Feronas 2013:140; Petmesidou and Glatzer 2015).
In labour market policy, retrenchment was also the dominant trend, despite the massive in-
crease in unemployment since 2008 (Theodoropoulou, 2018:16). This was firstly evident in the 
level of unemployment benefits. The unemployment insurance benefit was reduced (360 euros per 
month), following the reduction in the minimum wage (from 454 euros, before the crisis, to 360 in 
2012) and the eligibility criteria became stricter4. On the other hand, the unemployment assistance 
benefit has remained stable since 2003, thus resulting to a decline to 24 per cent of the minimum 
wage in 2012, compared to 38 per cent in 2003 (Matsaganis 2018). As a result, according to cal-
culations of a recent study using ELSTAT and OAED data (Matsaganis and Leventi 2017), in 2010, 
when the number of unemployed was still 639,000, the beneficiaries of the regular unemployment 
benefit were 224,000 (coverage rate 35.1%). By contrast, in the first ten months of 2017, while the 
number of unemployed had reached 1,030,000, the number of those receiving unemployment ben-
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efits had dropped to 121,000 (coverage rate 11,8%) (Table 2). In the area of Employment Protection 
Legislation (EPL) measures aimed at (a) relaxing the employment protection legislation of workers 
on regular contracts, (b) facilitating greater use of temporary and fixed-term contracts and (c) in-
creasing flexibility in working time arrangements (Theodoropoulou 2014:28). As regards the collec-
tive bargaining system, the scope of the national collective wage agreement was almost abolished 
by making the determination of minimum wages statutory rather than collectively agreed. Moreo-
ver, reforms in this area have effectively dismantled the collective regulation of working conditions, 
since employment agreements have increasingly sifted away from the national/sectoral level to the 
decentralized/enterprise level (Petmesidou and Glatzer 2015; Guilen and Pavolini 2015). Overall, 
labour market reforms have seriously damaged labor rights and have led to the development of a 
“flexicarity” model, that is flexibility without security (Petmesidou 2018). 
In health care, dramatic spending cuts and receding public provision have also been the 
main drivers of reforms. Between 2009 and 2015 Greece experienced the largest average annual 
reduction in health expenditure (6.6%) and showed one of the lowest percentages in public 
health spending: 5% compared with 7.8%, which is the EU average. At the same time private 
health spending accounted for 39% of total health spending, the fourth highest figure in the EU 
after Cyprus, Bulgaria and Latvia (OECD/EU 2016). The reorganization of health insurance under 
a new single entity (EOPYY – National Organization of Health Care) in 2011 has resulted to a re-
duction of the new unified and standardized reimbursement services for the insured. In addition, 
rising user charges in public hospital and health center outpatient departments, increasing co-
payments for medicines and rationing through increasing waiting times and other stalling mech-
anisms, have had negative effects, especially for vulnerable groups (Economou 2015). According 
to the latest Eurostat data, in 2015 about a fifth of the population in the lowest income quintile 
declared unmet health care needs due to high cost, long waiting lists or distance. In 2014, a new 
law was voted for Primary health Care, provided for the establishing of a Primary Health Care 
Network (PEDY) coordinated by the Regional Health Authorities and of a referral system based 
on family general practitioners (GPs). This resulted to a purchaser/provider split: EOPYY has been 
assigned the function of a funding organization, while PEDY has been assigned the function of a 
unified primary care network (Petmesidou and Glatzer 2015). However, lack of adequate funding 
undermines the potential benefits of these, otherwise, positive developments. EOPPY is expected 
to cover an increasing part of heath expenditures at a time when it’s seriously underfunded by 
the central budget (its debt is currently set about 2 billion euros), while its revenues are severely 
hampered by shrinking contributions due to high unemployment (Petmesidou, et al 2014, 2015; 
Zambarloukou 2015). On the other hand, the operation of PEDY is also undermined by reduced 
public funding, the shortage of doctors and medical practitioners5, while the referral system 
based on family GPs has not yet been implemented6. It seems that the content and the process 
of changes in the health sector, so far, have been reduced to a strictly technocratic/managerial 
exercise without adequate consideration of the real health needs of the population. As a recent 
study notes ‘in order for the Greek health care system to achieve its stated objectives – to provide 
comprehensive and high-quality services equitably, universally and free at the point of delivery – it 
should be geared towards citizens and facilitate patients’ orientation within the system’ (Econo-
mou et al 2015:131). A positive development to that direction is a recent legislation7 passed by 
the new Syriza government, which provides for the universal access to health care and medicines 
without having to contribute to their cost from 1 June 2016 for all uninsured8 and financially 
vulnerable Greek citizens, as well as for other vulnerable categories.
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Finally, in the field of social assistance, although a rhetoric for a social benefits’ system 
“rationalization” permeates MoUs instigated reforms in this area, the new measures introduced, 
with the blessings if not the imposition by the international creditors, were also sporadic and 
fragmented and have been seriously constrained by fiscal considerations. They concern mainly:
• The extension of the coverage of long-term unemployment benefit and the institution-
alization of self-employed unemployed (L.4093/12). Yet, the very strict eligibility criteria 
have resulted in the number of beneficiaries remaining extremely low (4.135 in 2016).
• The double reforming of the structure of the family allowance system (Laws 4093/12 and 
4512/18), with a view to rationalizing the system by redistributing family benefits to fami-
lies with 1 and 2 children, abolishing the special benefit of 500 euros per child for families 
with 3 or more children and further tightening the income criteria for their provision.
• The full implementation of Social Solidarity Income (SSI) from 1/1/2017 with a view to 
addressing extreme poverty (FEK128 / 24.01.2017). The program is structured in three 
pillars, including income support, promotion and safeguarding access to social services 
and goods and integration and reintegration into the labor market (by April 2017 the 
beneficiaries were 187.187). The implementation of the SSI also includes the package of 
interim measures to address the humanitarian crisis of Law 4320/2015 and Joint Ministe-
rial Decision 494/2015.
In the traditionally underdeveloped public long-term care sector, supply is unable to meet 
demand due to insufficient positions, limited coverage by public insurance organizations and 
the reduction of social spending (Petmesidou 2017:165). On the other hand, an effort is being 
made to continue the operation of some successful open-care programs created in previous years, 
notably through their integration into EU funding programs (eg. nurseries, child care structures, 
“Help at Home” programs etc.) (Petmesidou 2011).
In addition, some new structures and programs that have been created also depend on Eu-
ropean funding. These concern, for example, (a) the establishment of the Community Centers 
(L.4368/2016) at the Municipal level to support the implementation of social protection poli-
cies and the development of a local reference point for reception, service and interconnection of 
citizens with the corresponding programs implemented in the area of  their responsibility, (b) the 
Housing and Reintegration Program for the provision of housing and social support and rehabilita-
tion services for the homeless (extended until 31.12.2017 (Law 4445/2016) and the Fund for Euro-
pean Aid to the Most Deprived (FEAD), which supports the distribution of food and basic materials 
to the most deprived and is implemented throughout the country through Social Partnerships.
An overall first assessment of the welfare state reforms implemented in Greece during the 
crisis highlights an obvious asymmetry between the extent and intensity of the social and hu-
manitarian crisis and the public policy measures taken to address it (Sotiropoulos 2014b). As 
Matsaganis (2013:25) has noted ‘the balance of retrenchment versus expansionary policy changes 
remains overwhelmingly tilted towards the former. For every 100 euros saved as a result of cuts in 
pensions and social benefits….less than 5 euros is being reinvested in the policies for improving 
social protection…’. The dominance of the doctrine of neo-liberal austerity and its imposition 
on Greece during the period of the crisis has led to the further deregulation of an already prob-
lematic welfare state. The recipe that is being implemented leads to shrinking the middle class 
and transferring resources from the less vulnerable to the totally poor and impoverished, widen-
ing the gap between the few privileged and a rapidly growing number of precariously working, 
vulnerable, poor and socially excluded. 
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In short, after 2010, social policy reforms in Greece marked a substantial decline in formal 
welfare state solidarity. 
3.3. The rise of informal solidarity 
As the economic crisis evolved, it was evident that most people in need could not rely on a 
constantly retreating formal welfare state solidarity. Moreover, the capacity of the Greek fam-
ily to play it’s traditional role in providing social care for it’s members has been significantly 
constrained (Lyberaki and Tinios 2014). In a context of extreme deterioration in economic condi-
tions, women face the difficulty of combining work and family care due to the lack of adequate 
public social structures and the growing need for care in the family caused by the return of adult 
children home due to the crisis (Petmesidou 2013). In other words, the family is called upon to 
play an even more prominent role in protecting its members against social risks within a context 
where its capacity to consolidate and mobilize resources is dramatically reduced (Papadopoulos 
and Roumbakis 2009:18).
The huge gaps in social protection created by the crisis and the inability of the welfare state 
and the family to effectively mitigate it’s social consequences are seen as the main factors that 
facilitated the rise of informal solidarity in post-crisis Greece (Sotiropoulos and Bourikos 2014; 
Sotiropoulos 2014a; Tzifakis, Petropoulos and Huliaras 2017; Kavoulakos and Gritzas 2015; Sim-
iti 2014; Kantzara 2014). We could distinguish two main aspects of transformation of informal 
solidarity in Greece after the crisis. 
Firstly, a gradual change in the organization and operation of typical9 social solidarity or-
ganizations (mainly NGO’s). On the one hand, most of them came under severe economic strain 
or even stopped their operation as government limited and eventually stopped (in 2012) state 
funding, while at the same time their revenues from small private donations and CSR programs 
were drastically reduced (Tzifakis, Petropoulos and Huliaras 2017). On the other hand, new NGOs 
were formed and along with the remaining older ones became more active in social solidarity 
aiming at complementing welfare state provision. Counting on an increased number of volun-
teers they collaborate with state actors, the Greek Orthodox Church, private business and not for 
profit foundations, providing care not only for their traditional target groups, but also for newly 
impoverished Greek citizens seeking social services and basic consumer goods (Sotiropoulos and 
Bourikos 2014:51). Moreover, the crisis has helped to reduce their dependence on the state and 
gave rise to new sources of funding, most importantly EU programs and large private Foundations 
(eg. Niarchos Foundation, Bodossaki Foundation, Onassis Foundation etc.) (Sotiropoulos 2014a; 
Simiti 2014; Kavoulakos and Gritzas 2015). 
Secondly and most importantly, the emergence and expansion, for the first time, of new 
atypical10 social solidarity organizations, networks and forms of action, ranging from spontane-
ous protests, civil disobedience and the formation of alternative political, economic and so-
cial spaces (Kavoulakos and Gritzas 2015:338). A typical example of spontaneous protest were 
the ‘square movements’ which, at the time of Memorandum’s vote, became symbolic points of 
questioning the dominant economic and political system. This spontaneous mobilization of et-
eronymous social groups expressed the democratic feeling of civil society, revealing at the same 
time the strengthening of cohesion at the micro-level, as well as the lifting of confidence in the 
macro-society. The rejection of the two major parties (ND and PASOK) in the 2012 elections and 
the mass withdrawal of deposits from the banking system clearly showed the growing distrust 
of the Greek people over the political institutions and the magnitude of the widespread social 
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crisis (Sotiropoulos 2014; Koniordos 2015). Another type of civil society’s protest took the form 
of civil disobedience actions, such as the “do not pay” movement. A significant proportion of 
the Greek population refused to pay tolls, taxes and electricity rebate fees and participated in 
efforts to avoid auctions. These initiatives, in spite of their fragmentary nature, have contributed 
to the questioning of the dominant policy of coping with the crisis, highlighting the importance 
of self-organization and collective claims (Kavoulakos and Gritzas 2015:345).
In parallel, and partly as a consequence from the above protest movements a large number 
of new social solidarity structures and initiatives emerged and became active in most sub-sectors 
of social protection (eg. health care, social assistance, education, etc.) offering help to those 
most affected by the crisis. They include ‘time banks’ (that is voluntary networks in which partici-
pants commit time to help one another), social medical centers, social pharmacies, social grocery 
stores, intermediary markets, community kitchens, ‘social cramming schools’ (koinonika fronti-
stiria) and other informal groups and networks (Sotiropoulos and Bourikos 2014). Recent field 
research has recorded more than 500 new alternative projects and initiatives in the area of social 
solidarity that have emerged across the country over the last 6 years (Afouxenidis 2015:331). Al-
though their variety and diversity make generalization difficult, these social structures and initia-
tives differ in many respects from traditional forms of civil society, such as NGOs and associations. 
They are usually atypical, self-organized, often lack legal status, are economically independent 
of the state and the market, take their decisions through democratic processes, they challenge 
the dominant political social and economic practices and values and develop new ones based on 
solidarity, reciprocity, equality, respect for diversity and the right to self-determination (Kavoula-
kos and Gritzas 2015:346). In this respect, ‘they want to treat the beneficiaries of their activities 
as participants in the collective production and distribution of social assistance, and view social 
solidarity in the context of the economic crisis as part of a wider political movement to construct 
alternative forms of social and economic life’ (Sotiropoulos and Bourikos 2014:52).
Admittedly, the rise of informal solidarity (both typical and atypical) has played an important 
role in offering immediate relief to those suffering from the social consequences of the economic 
crisis. Relevant literature has highlighted the added value of the involvement of - mostly the atyp-
ical - social solidarity organizations and networks in the provision of social services. First, they are 
closer to, more familiar and more flexible in terms of meeting the changing needs of their target 
groups. Second, they do not stigmatize their beneficiaries since the latter are also participants 
rather than passive receivers of goods and services (Bourikos and Sotiropoulos 2014:48-49). Some 
scholars have adopted an even more radical view by arguing that informal solidarity, as expressed 
during the crisis, could contribute to changing society from bottom up and gradually lead to a 
new “paradigm” of organizing social relations, alternative to the prevailing neoliberal capitalism 
(Katzara 2014:276).
In our view, what is most important is the clarification of the real social impact, future 
potential as well as the limits of informal solidarity. Obviously, the answer to these questions re-
quires a systematic field research with regard to the density, duration, values as well as the quan-
tity and quality of services offered by informal social solidarity organizations (Bourikos 2013:29). 
In this respect, recent preliminary research results seem to put in question some of the aforemen-
tioned advantages of the involvement of informal social solidarity organizations in the provision 
of social services. The accessibility of services seems to be unequal, with spatial inequalities 
being the most typical example: concentration of social programs in specific municipalities and 
non-existence in others, which adds to a differentiated access to welfare coverage. The universal-
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ity on the basis of gender, religion, belief, language, origin seems to be a demand, since social 
initiatives of groups and parties with clear racial and intolerant orientation are being developed, 
excluding “others” from any social assistance offered. The duration of their operation is one of 
the major challenges in order to provide a stable safety net for people in need. Moreover, the 
criterion of respect for the rights and personality of the target groups is violated by the practice of 
several typical and atypical initiatives (eg, television coverage without their own approval, viola-
tion of sensitive personal data etc.). Finally, in many cases a paternalistic and moral assessment of 
the service providers is preferred, with no regard for ensuring their participation in the planning, 
provision and evaluation of the services provided (Bourikos 2013:28).
A second key question concerns the relationship between informal social solidarity organi-
zations and the welfare state. The recognition of the failure of a problematic – already before the 
crisis - formal welfare state solidarity to cope with the social consequences of the economic crisis 
does not automatically imply neither an unconditional shift to informal solidarity nor a legitima-
tion of a welfare state inertia or inaction. The great danger that lies here for social solidarity is to 
gradually loose its institutional status as a social right fulfilled by the welfare state and to result 
in a minimal, residual and differentiated coverage of immediate survival needs in a voluntary 
manner by informal civil society organizations. The welfare state, as the main expression of the 
collective in modern democracies, must remain at any cost the guarantor of social solidarity in 
good and hard times, at a time when neo-liberal capitalism has dominated the world (Sakellaro-
poulos 2011:61).
4. Conclusion
T raditionally, social solidarity in Greece was fragmented, inequitable, politically and socially biased and inefficient, with the family playing a key role in covering the gaps of the formal 
welfare state sector. In this paper we have argued that the severe economic crisis that has sur-
faced in Greece over the last seven years, not only has resulted to an unprecedented social crisis 
but has also challenged long established domestic patterns of solidarity. What comes out from 
the foregoing analysis is a double transformation. 
First, the crisis has contributed to a process of retrenchment of formal welfare state solidar-
ity, largely imposed by the successive bail out agreements with the Troika. It has highlighted 
the inefficiency of the Greek welfare state and despite the fact that the extreme social condi-
tions that have been created have made it imperative to undertake public policy initiatives on 
“cushioning” the social consequences of the crisis, this has not happened. Instead, the reforms 
launched under the country’s successive Memorandum of Understandings (MoUs), from 2010 
onwards, have led to a further degradation of an already perforated social safety net. While 
social spending cuts were universal (health, social security, social welfare, etc.), the measures to 
support the most vulnerable social groups were sporadic and fragmentary, unable to compensate 
for the huge losses caused by the great waves of austerity. Moreover, in a context of extreme 
deterioration in economic conditions, the capacity of the Greek family to play it’s traditional role 
in providing social care for it’s members has been significantly constrained. 
Second, the crisis has influenced a substantial rise in informal solidarity. The huge gaps in 
social protection created by the crisis and the inability of the welfare state and the family to ef-
fectively mitigate it’s social consequences were the main factors that facilitated the emergence 
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and expansion of informal solidarity that took two main forms: (a) the transformation of tradi-
tional typical civil society organizations (NGOs) in terms of their aims, organization structures, 
activities, sources of funding and relations with the state; and, (b) the mobilization of a vast 
variety of new atypical social structures, groups and initiatives in providing immediate relief to 
the ‘victims’ of the economic crisis.
Undoubtedly, the rise of informal solidarity (both typical and atypical) has played an impor-
tant role in offering immediate relief to those suffering from the social consequences of the eco-
nomic crisis. However, it has not managed to fill the huge social protection gaps, left over after 
the welfare state had receded. In this respect, informal solidarity is far from being considered 
neither as a panacea for solving social problems nor as a substitute to welfare state solidarity at 
a time when the demand for social protection has increased dramatically. 
Notes
1. A detailed analysis of these changes is beyond of the scope of this paper. For a compre-
hensive review of the Greek welfare state reforms under the MoUs see Matsaganis 2013; 
Petmesidou and Glatzer 2015; Theodoropoulou 2014; Zambarloukou 2015, Adam and Pa-
patheodorou 2016.
2. The basic pension will also be provided to the non-insured, but only if the meet the age, 
income and years of residence criteria.
3. On average, of 30 per cent, going up to 60 per cent for the high pension benefit brackets 
(Petmesidou and Glatzer 2015:166). Βy 2019 the abolition of EKAS and a new round of pen-
sion cuts of up to 18% is foreseen under the commitments of the third MoU.
4. In 2013 an additional restriction was introduced whereby eligibility for the unemployment 
benefit could not exceed 450 days, within a four year period, while in 2014 this was further 
reduced to 400 days.
5. Many doctors didn’t choose to join PEDY due to the fact that they would have to give up their 
private practice, while at the same time their salaries as public sector doctors were substan-
tially reduced (see Zambarloukou 2015:664).
6. The reform of primary care is still underway by the Ministry of Health. The new system pro-
vides for the activation of the concept of the family doctor, either through public structures 
like the Local Health Units (TOMY) or through contracts with freelance doctors, who will 
navigate citizens through the Health care system.
7. Joint Ministerial Decision A3(g)/GP/oik. 25132/2016, “Regulations to ensure access of the 
uninsured to the Public Health System”, Official Government Gazette, Issue B, No 908 / 4-4-
2016.
8. According to the National Social Insurance Registry (ATLAS), approximately 2.5 million of the 
population has no insurance coverage for health care.
9. They have been formally set up by registering with the first instance civil court of their region. 
They have their own standing orders or by-laws and a recognizable, usually elected, adminis-
trative board (see Sotiropoulos and Bourikos 2014:34).
10. Networks and groups in which individuals participate, forming informal ties both amongst them 
and with the beneficiaries of their activities. They may still be understood as organizations 
although they do not adopt an officially approved name nor are they registered with judicial 
authorities, as is the case with formal organizations (see Sotiropoulos and Bourikos 2014:34).
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